Subsidising carbon capture : effects on energy prices and market shares in the power market by Aune, Finn Roar et al.
Discussion Papers No. 595, October 2009 
Statistics Norway, Research Department 
Finn Roar Aune, Gang Liu,  
Knut Einar Rosendahl and Eirik Lund Sagen 
Subsidising carbon capture  
Effects on energy prices and market 
shares in the power market 
Abstract: 
This paper examines how ambitious climate policies and subsidies to carbon capture may affect 
international energy prices and market shares in the power market. A detailed numerical model of 
the international energy markets is used. We first conclude that an ambitious climate policy alone will 
have substantial effects in the power market, with considerable growth in renewable power 
production and eventually use of carbon capture. Gas power production will also benefit from such a 
policy. Subsidising carbon capture and storage (CCS) will significantly accelerate the use of this 
technology. Nevertheless, total production of coal and gas power (with or without CCS) is only 
marginally increased, as the subsidy mainly leads to installation of CCS equipment on existing 
plants, reducing the efficiency from these plants. Consequently, electricity prices are almost 
unchanged, and the substantial growth in renewable power production is hardly affected by the 
subsidies to CCS. 
Keywords: Energy markets, Climate policy, Carbon capture 
JEL classification: H23, Q40, Q54 
Acknowledgement: We are grateful for financial support from the Renergi Programme and the 
Petrosam Programme of the Research Council of Norway, and for valuable comments from Mads 
Greaker and Cathrine Hagem. 
Address: Finn Roar Aune, Statistics Norway, Research Department. E-mail: fau@ssb.no 
Gang Liu, Statistics Norway, Research Department. E-mail: liu@ssb.no 
Knut Einar Rosendahl, Statistics Norway, Research Department. E-mail: ker@ssb.no 
Eirik Lund Sagen, Skagerak Kraft AS. E-mail: Eirik.LundSagen@skagerakenergi.no 
Discussion Papers comprise research papers intended for international journals or books. A preprint of a 
Discussion Paper may be longer and more elaborate than a standard journal article, as it 
may include intermediate calculations and background material etc. 
 
 
 
 
Abstracts with downloadable Discussion Papers  
in PDF are available on the Internet: 
http://www.ssb.no 
http://ideas.repec.org/s/ssb/dispap.html 
 
 
For printed Discussion Papers contact: 
 
Statistics Norway 
Sales- and subscription service  
NO-2225 Kongsvinger 
 
Telephone: +47 62 88 55 00 
Telefax: +47 62 88 55 95 
E-mail:  Salg-abonnement@ssb.no 
3 
1. Introduction 
Recognizing that emissions of greenhouse gases (GHG) contribute significantly to climate change, 
there is growing support worldwide for setting ambitious targets to reduce such emissions.1 It is clear 
that no such targets will ever be met without substantial reduction of CO2 emissions from the power 
sector. The use of fossil fuels in power generation, primarily coal and gas, accounts for about 41 
percent of all CO2 emissions in the world (IEA, 2007a, p.195). 
 
Given the large share of fossil fuels in current and projected power generation (EIA, 2008; IEA, 
2007a), measures to address climate change will most likely embrace solutions for power generation 
from fossil fuels with radically reduced CO2 emissions. In this sense, technologies for carbon capture 
and storage (CCS) may play a crucial role in a portfolio of existing and emerging technologies. CCS 
technologies remove CO2 emissions from stationary sources such as power plants, production of 
synthetic transport fuels and other industry processes, for storage in geologic formations or the ocean. 
Mineral storage is another possibility. Carbon capture allows for continued utilization of conventional 
fossil fuels while significantly reducing carbon emissions.  
 
Carbon capture is high on the energy policy agenda in most OECD countries. The EU Strategic 
Energy Technology Plan recognizes the demonstration of the use of CCS in power generation as one 
of the focus areas for European technology development (EU, 2007).2 The new Obama administration 
(and the new composition of the US Congress) is expected to introduce a major change in US energy 
and climate policies, including support for power plants with CCS. 3 Carbon capture is also high on the 
policy and/or research agenda in other OECD countries like Japan, Canada and Australia. Non-OECD 
countries are generally less focused on CCS, but not ignorant.4 Clearly, the gradual introduction and 
diffusion of power generation with CCS technologies throughout the world will reshape the 
international energy markets. 
 
                                                     
1 For instance, the EU has set ambitious goals for own emissions in 2020, with deeper cuts expected beyond 2020 (EU, 
2008a). In the US, The American Clean Energy and Security Act including an economy-wide cap-and-trade system was 
passed by the US House of Representatives in June 2009. 
(http://energycommerce.house.gov/index.php?option=com_content&view=article&id=1633&catid=155&Itemid=55) 
2 To stimulate development of carbon capture, the European Commission proposes an enabling regulatory framework and the 
inclusion of CCS in the EU Emission Trading Scheme (ETS). To make early demonstration feasible, major financial 
commitments are needed (EU, 2008b). 
3 In The American Clean Energy and Security Act (see footnote 1), carbon capture plays a significant role as a “clean 
energy”, with specific programs for demonstration and early deployment.  
4 For instance, in China a pilot project capturing CO2 from a coal power plant has been launched. 
(http://www.sciencedaily.com/releases/2008/07/080731135924.htm)  
4 
A number of studies by means of either national or global energy-environment models  (e.g., Edmonds 
et al., 2002; Johnson and Keith, 2004; McFarland et al., 2004; IEA, 2006, 2007a; The Energy Journal 
Special Issue, 2006; Martinsen et al., 2007) and several reviews (e.g., IPCC, 2005; IEA, 2007b) have 
made assessments on CCS technologies as one of the potential options for mitigating climate change. 
The focuses of these studies and reviews are primarily on availability, timing and costs of CCS for 
mitigating climate change. In general, they find that CCS technologies are already technically feasible 
and could play an important role in reducing carbon emissions, but only if policies that impose a 
sufficiently high implicit or explicit price on such emissions are in place. For large emission 
reductions and high carbon prices, access to CCS technologies substantially lowers the total mitigation 
costs. It has been suggested that a significant number of new plants with carbon capture could enter 
the power supply sector within the next few decades, whereas retrofits with CCS technologies 
included could enter in just a few years given a sufficiently high price on emissions (IPCC, 2005; 
Newell et al., 2006).  
 
Instead of focusing on availability, timing and costs of CCS technologies, this paper looks into how 
carbon capture may influence the international energy markets, in a world with ambitious climate 
policies possibly combined with subsidies to CCS. In particular, we examine the effects on market 
shares of coal and gas power of subsidizing carbon capture, and the effects on gas, coal and electricity 
prices. With much uncertainty about current and future costs of CCS technologies, we support our 
conclusions with several sensitivity analyses. 
 
The future importance of CCS will crucially depend on how its costs develop through technological 
progress. Recent years have witnessed an increasing emphasis on analysing the potential of policy 
induced technological change for addressing the climate change problem.5 Technological progress is a 
product of several distinct forces, typically classified into (1) R&D - public and private sector 
knowledge investment, or so-called “learning by searching”, and (2) LbD - reducing the costs of 
existing technologies through “learning by doing” (Grubb et al., 2006).  
 
Market-oriented measures such as carbon taxes and tradable emission permits will lead to innovation 
and improvements in low-carbon technologies such as CCS by stimulating R&D and LbD (see e.g. 
Requate and Unold, 2003).6 However, due to the presence of spillovers of knowledge, both from R&D 
and LbD, the market will most likely undersupply new technologies even if the price of greenhouse 
                                                     
5 See e.g. Greaker and Rosendahl (2008), Hart (2008), Kverndokk and Rosendahl (2007), Gerlagh and van der Zwaan (2006) 
and The Energy Journal Special Issue (2006). 
6 For instance, as a direct response to a high carbon tax imposed by the Norwegian government in 1991, the company Statoil 
has since 1996 been capturing, compressing and injecting, during natural gas extraction, about 1 million tonne of CO2 per 
year into a deep saline aquifer off the shore of Norway (IEA, 2006). 
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gas emissions is set correctly, i.e., at the Pigouvian level (Hart, 2008). Moreover, along with the 
globalization of markets, technological change is mainly an international process today, which means 
that the development of CCS technologies in one country will be influenced by the development 
elsewhere. Therefore, direct support of technological innovations is needed, possibly at the 
international level. Spillover effects may exist not only across countries or regions, but also across 
different types of power plants and technologies. For example, the development of CCS technologies 
in gas power plants may benefit from that in coal power plants, and vice versa. 
 
There exist a variety of capture methods, which can be broadly classified as post-combustion, pre-
combustion and oxy-combustion. In post-combustion a solvent is used to capture CO2 from the flue 
gas of power plants. This method can be considered a current technology, but its demonstration at 
large-scale power plants is needed. Thus LbD is more relevant here. In pre-combustion the fuel is 
reacted with air or oxygen and then with steam to produce a mixture of CO2 and H2, of which the 
former is removed and the latter is used as the fuel. Pre-combustion is somewhat proven for PF 
(Pulverised Fuel) plants, but less so for IGCC (Integrated Gasification Combined Cycle) plants (IEA, 
2007b). Therefore, both R&D and LbD are necessary in pre-combustion. Oxy-combustion uses 
oxygen instead of air and results in a flue gas consisting mainly of CO2, and may lead to nearly zero 
GHG emissions after capture (IEA, 2007b). This method is at a relatively early stage of development 
and thus necessitates more R&D. 
 
IEA (2006) states that the current costs of CCS applied to power generation are estimated at between 
40 and 90 US$ per tonne of CO2 captured and stored depending on the power plant fuel and the 
technologies used. Integrating CCS into new coal-fired plants is in general least expensive, whereas 
retrofitting existing gas-fired plants is most expensive. The bulk of the cost is on the capture side, with 
transport and storage costs ranging from 4 to 12 US$ per tonne of CO2 (IEA, 2006, 2007b). The 
captured CO2 can in some cases be used for enhanced oil recovery (EOR), or enhanced coal bed 
methane (ECBM) projects, which means that mitigation costs for such projects could be lower and in 
extreme cases negative (IPCC, 2005; IEA, 2006). 
 
To carry out the analysis in this paper, we apply a multi-period, partial equilibrium model for the 
global energy markets (Aune et al., 2005, 2009; Rosendahl and Sagen, 2009). By means of this model 
we investigate and compare two main policy scenarios: One scenario with an ambitious, international 
climate policy, and one scenario where this same climate policy is supplemented with considerable 
subsidies to CCS investments. We examine how the two policy scenarios may affect incentives to 
retrofit old power plants with CCS, and to invest in new plants with CCS, and how future energy 
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prices are influenced by these policies. Different assumptions regarding current costs of CCS, learning 
rates for CCS technologies, and policies are considered. 
 
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. In Section 2 we use a simple theoretical analysis to show 
how reductions in costs of CCS (either due to technological progress or subsidies) may affect energy 
prices. Section 3 presents the numerical model FRISBEE. In Section 4 we discuss the numerical 
results, and Section 5 concludes. 
2. Theoretical analysis 
In our theoretical analysis we consider a partial equilibrium model of a closed competitive power 
market, consisting of five different technologies: Gas power with (GC) and without (GP) CCS, coal 
power with (CC) and without (CP) CCS, and renewable power (RP).  
 
The supply of power by technology j is represented by a supply function Sj, which is the inverse 
function of the aggregated marginal cost function for all firms having technology j. Supply is a 
decreasing function of the input costs pi + τ·CO2j, where pi denotes the input price of fuel i (i = gas 
(G), coal (C)) used by technology j, τ the price of CO2-emissions, and CO2j the emissions per fuel use 
for technology j. Input costs are assumed to be zero for renewable power.  
 
First order conditions for production of technology j are given by MCj = pE, where MCj denotes 
marginal costs and pE the price of electricity. Let Aj be an exogenous factor so that MCj = Aj pE. This 
factor may either be interpreted as an ad valorem production subsidy (with Aj > 1), or as an exogenous 
technology index equal to all firms with technology j (an increase in Aj reduces MCj/Aj and thus 
represents technological progress). Supply from technology j is then an increasing function of the 
electricity price pE times the exogenous factor Aj. In the theoretical analysis we only consider changes 
in Aj for CCS technologies. 
 
Let D denote the power demand function, which is decreasing in the price. Market equilibrium in the 
power market is then given by: 
 
(1) 
( ) ( ) ( )
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We normalise Aj=1 initially. 
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Furthermore, supply of gas and coal (alternatively, supply minus demand in other sectors/countries) 
are given by the functions Si(pi), which are increasing in pi. We assume that there is a fixed conversion 
rate between fuel input and electricity output for each technology, given by αj. This implies that 
E i
j j j
p p
S Sα = − , where Sjp denotes the derivative of Sj with respect to p. Market equilibria in the gas and 
coal markets are then given by: 
 
(2) ( ) ( ) ( )2 , 2 ,GP GP G GP E GC GC G GC GC E G GS p CO p S p CO A p S pα τ α τ+ + + =  
(3) ( ) ( ) ( )2 , 2 ,CP CP C CP E CC CC C CC CC E C CS p CO p S p CO A p S pα τ α τ+ + + =  
 
In order to simplify the derivations below, we assume that coal prices are unaffected by changes in the 
power market, e.g., due to a horizontal supply function.7 We also assume that the CO2 price and the 
technology-specific emission rates are fixed. Fuel and electricity units are normalised so that αGP=1, 
which means that (αGC – 1) denotes the extra gas needed to produce the same quantity of electricity 
when CCS is used. 
 
What are the effects of exogenous increases in AGC and ACC, i.e., either subsidies to production of 
power with CCS, or technological progress for CCS technologies? The effects in the power market 
and the gas market are found by totally differentiating equations (1)-(2): 
 
(4) 
( )
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G E G E
E E E E
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(5) ( )( )G E G E GGP G GP E GC GC G GC E E GC G Gp p p p pS dp S dp S dp S dp p dA S dpα+ + + + =  
 
There are two endogenous variables in equations (4) and (5), i.e., dpG and dpE. By using Kramer’s 
rule, we get: 
 
(6) 
( ) ( )E E E E E E EE GC GP GC GC GC E CC GP GC GCp p p p p p pG GC CCp S S S p S S Sdp dA dAα α α+ − Φ += +
Δ Δ
 
 
                                                     
7 For an individual region such as Europe, it seems fair to assume a horizontal supply function for coal but not for gas. On a 
global scale the assumption is less realistic, although in the medium to long run we believe the supply function to be 
relatively flat. 
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(7) 
( ) ( )1 E G G GE G G CC E GP GC GC GE GC G GP GC p p p pp p pE GC CCS p S S Sp S S Sdp dA dAαα  + −+ − = −
Δ Δ
 
 
where8 
 
( ) ( ) 0E E E G E E E G E GGP GC GC GP GC GP GC GC GC Gp p p p p p p p p pS S S S S S Sα α αΔ = Φ − − + Φ − − − Φ <  
 
and  
 
0E E E E E E EGP GC CP CC RPp p p p p p pS S S S S DΦ = + + + + − >  
 
The price effects clearly depend on whether or not both AGC and ACC are increased, and the relative 
increases of the two factors. Assume first that dAGC > 0 and dACC = 0, so that only gas power with CCS 
is stimulated through technological progress or targeted subsidies. Consider first the sign of dpG. This 
is definitely positive, as the numerator in front of dAGC in equation (6) is negative. This is as expected 
– increased profitability of gas power with CCS increases the demand for gas, raising the gas price. 
 
The sign of dpE is actually ambiguous, and depends on the supply elasticity of gas, the efficiency loss 
of using CCS in gas power plants, and the price elasticity of conventional gas power (cf. equation (7)). 
If gas supply is almost fixed and the efficiency loss of CCS is substantial, technological change in gas 
power with CCS may lead to higher electricity prices. The explanation is that increased use of gas 
power with CCS reduces the supply of conventional gas power due to higher gas prices, and total 
power production can then be reduced since gas power with CCS is less efficient than conventional 
gas power. This ambiguity is confirmed in the simulations below, where we find somewhat mixed 
results for dpE.  
 
A possibly positive price effect for electricity has some interesting implications: First, it would imply 
that production of renewable power increases as a consequence of increased profitability of CCS. 
Second, because total electricity demand falls when the price increases, total gas power production, 
i.e., with or without CCS, must decrease (as both coal power and renewable power increase 
production). 
 
                                                     
8 Δ < 0 follows from the observation that the sum of the two first terms are less than ( )2( ) 2 1 0E EGC GC GC GPP PS Sα α− + − <  
(because αGC>1). Here we have also used that E Gj j jP PS Sα = − . 
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Assume now that also dACC >0. The fraction in front of dACC in equation (7) is definitely negative 
because coal prices are fixed in this model. Therefore, subsidies to coal power with CCS, or 
technological progress for this technology, has a negative effect on the electricity price. The higher is 
dACC compared to dAGC, the more unlikely it is that pE increases.  
 
What about dpG? Now the sign in equation (6) is ambiguous, as the term in front of dACC is negative. 
The more elastic are coal power with CCS and gas power with and without CCS, the larger is this 
term. We conclude that subsidies or technological progress for CCS technologies have ambiguous 
impacts on natural gas prices, particularly depending on the relative sizes of dAGC and dACC.9  
3. FRISBEE – A model of international energy markets 
In the numerical analysis we use the FRISBEE model, which is a recursive, dynamic partial 
equilibrium model of the international energy markets, with one year period length.10 Supply and 
demand of fossil fuels and electricity are modelled in 13 global regions, cf. Table 1. The model 
accounts for discoveries, reserves, field development and production of oil and natural gas in each 
region. Coal production is also modelled explicitly in each region, but in a simpler way. The power 
sector demands fossil fuels, and transforms them into electricity. Production of electricity is based on 
already installed capacities, which are modelled endogenously (see below). There are two end-user 
sectors in the model: ‘Manufacturing industries’ and ‘Others’ (including household consumption). The 
base year of the model is 2000, and it is programmed in GAMS (Brooke et al., 2005). 
 
Table 1. Regions in the FRISBEE model 
Industrialised regions Regions in transition Developing regions 
Canada  Caspian region  Africa  
OECD Pacific  Eastern Europe  China  
USA Russia/Ukraine/Belarus  Latin America  
Western Europe   OPEC-Middle East 
  Rest-Asia  
  OPEC-Africa 
 
End-user demand for any energy good depends on the end-user prices of all energy goods. The 
exogenous parameters population growth, income growth and energy efficiency also affect end-user 
                                                     
9 Note that targeted research into gas power with CCS could have negative impacts on gas prices if there are spillover effects 
between different CCS technologies, so that both AGC and ACC are increased. 
10 See Aune et al. (2005; 2009) and Rosendahl and Sagen (2009) for a more extensive presentation of the FRISBEE model. 
The model description in the current paper focuses mostly on the power market, which is particularly important in our 
analysis. 
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demand in the model. Towards 2050 per capita income growth for the individual regions is assumed to 
approach each other with a mean growth around 2.5 per cent per year in the long run. The direct price 
elasticities for the end-user sectors vary mostly between -0.1 and -0.4 in the long run, and between 
-0.03 and -0.2 in the short run. Cross-price elasticities are in general smaller. Per capita income 
elasticities vary a lot, from negative elasticities for coal in Western Europe to above one for natural 
gas in several regions.  
 
In FRISBEE, fossil fuels are traded between regions, whereas electricity is only traded within each 
region. Oil and coal trade take place via a common pool, whereas gas trade takes place bilaterally due 
to larger transport costs (Rosendahl and Sagen, 2009). The gas and coal markets are assumed to be 
competitive, with no formal link from oil to gas prices (as in many traditional gas contracts). In the oil 
market, OPEC’s market power is taken into account (cf. Aune et al., 2005).11  
 
Extraction of oil and gas in FRISBEE is based on running production capacities, marginal operating 
costs and regional producer prices. Investments in exploration, field development and reserve 
extensions are driven by expected returns, based on adaptive price expectations, and unit operating and 
capital costs. Production of coal is based on total marginal extraction costs (i.e., including capital 
costs) and regional prices (production capacities are not explicitly modelled). 
 
FRISBEE accounts for production in 9 endogenous and 6 exogenous power technologies; see Table 2. 
Four of these include carbon capture and storage (CCS), either as a post-combustion technology 
(“post-CCS”) or as an integrated technology (“pre-CCS”). For the endogenous technologies, power 
production is based on installed capacities, while investment in new capacity adds to total production 
capacity in future years. Production of electricity from the endogenous technologies depend on the 
price of electricity, the price of energy input (except for wind power), the price of carbon emissions, 
fuel efficiency (conversion rate), and operating costs. For CCS power plants, costs of transport and 
storage of CO2 also matter. Because electricity produced from different technologies are perfect 
substitutes, the least-cost technologies will always be chosen. Thus, substitution possibilities between 
fossil fuels are much higher here than in the two end-user sectors. For the exogenous technologies, 
future power production is projected based on e.g. EIA (2008).
                                                     
11 In the current analysis, however, the oil price path is held constant in real terms at US$2007 47 per barrel in all scenarios 
(from 2010), with OPEC being the residual supplier. Although this is a simplification, it has negligible influence on the 
results in this paper. There are no investments in oil power plants in any scenario at this price level, which most likely is an 
underestimation of the future oil price level. Thus, varying the oil price would only affect the utilisation rate of existing oil 
power capacity. Given the small share of oil power in global power production (falling from 7 to 3 per cent in our Reference 
Scenario), and the small share of global oil production going to the power sector (falling from 9 to 3 per cent), the results 
would have been approximately the same with a more realistic modelling of the oil price. 
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Table 2. Power technologies in the FRISBEE model 
Endogenous technologies Learning rate included? Exogenous technologies 
Gas power No Nuclear power 
Gas power with post-CCS Yes Hydropower 
Gas power with pre-CCS Yes Solar power 
Coal power No Lignite power 
Coal power with post-CCS Yes Waste power 
Coal power with pre-CCS Yes Other renewable power 
Oil power No  
Bio power Yes  
Wind power Yes  
 
As in the gas and oil producing sectors, investments in new power capacities are driven by expected 
returns. Net present values are calculated for the different power technologies in different regions, 
based on adaptive expectations for fuel prices, carbon emissions prices and electricity prices, a pre-
specified required rate of return (we assume a real rate of 10 per cent), and cost elements such as 
investment costs and operating/maintenance costs. There is a time lag between investment decision 
and production start-up, which varies across technologies (from one year for wind power to six years 
for coal power with pre-CCS). In the short run, unit capital costs are assumed to be an increasing 
function of the amount of investments within the same technology and/or within the same region, as 
accelerated construction of new plants tends to push up construction costs. In the long run, we assume 
there are learning potential in non-mature technologies such as CCS, wind and bio power, driving 
down their capital costs. Based on IEA (2006) and Rao et al. (2006), global learning rates are assumed 
to be 5-7 per cent for wind and bio power and 13 per cent for CCS technologies in the main scenarios. 
We also consider more optimistic learning rates for CCS in some sensitivity scenarios. A learning rate 
of x per cent means that unit investment costs for a technology fall by x per cent for every doubling of 
accumulated global production capacity of this specific technology. Costs and efficiencies of different 
power technologies (including CCS) are based on various sources (Aune et al., 2008; IEA, 2005; MIT, 
2007; Riahi et al., 2004; Rubin et al., 2007). 
 
Efficiency of existing plants varies a lot across regions. For new plants, however, we assume that state 
of the art technologies are used, gradually increasing the average efficiency of the installed capacity. 
This may be a too optimistic assumption for some regions, but it shouldn’t affect our main results. In 
addition to building new coal or gas plants with CCS, we also allow for retrofitting old plants with 
post-CCS technologies. Investment decisions for post-CCS are similar to the ones for new plants, 
except that the relevant present value here is the difference in profitability before and after retrofitting. 
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Regional costs of wind and bio power are negatively affected by global learning effects, but positively 
affected by regional resource scarcity. That is, we assume that the best remaining wind locations 
within a region are always chosen first (when profitable). The same applies to supply of bio mass, 
which leads to a bio supply function that increases with the price of bio mass (bio power plants also 
compete with other users of bio mass, or other crops that can be cultivated at the same location, 
implying a price sensitive supply function). Initially, learning effects are in general more important 
than scarcity effects for both wind and bio, but when wind and/or bio power matures, the scarcity 
effects dominate. Regional wind potentials are based on Archer and Jacobson (2005), de Vries et al. 
(2007) and Aune et al. (2008), whereas bio supply potentials and costs are based on Haq (2002) and de 
Vries et al. (2007). 
 
There are lots of uncertainties about current and future costs and efficiencies of different power 
technologies around the world, not least CCS technologies. Consequently, we run several sensitivity 
analyses where crucial assumptions related to carbon capture are changed.  
4. Numerical simulations 
4.1 Scenario description 
We consider three main scenarios in this paper; one reference scenario plus two alternative scenarios 
(see Table 3). The Reference Scenario is referred to as one where all Annex B countries excluding the 
US impose a CO2 tax of 10 US$2000 per tonne of CO2, starting from 2008 and remaining valid 
throughout our model horizon. The choice of this scenario as a reference one is because it is close to 
the current situation with the Kyoto Protocol prolonged into the future. Thus, it serves well as a 
benchmark scenario for our comparison analyses. 
 
Table 3. Scenario description 
Scenario name Scenario description 
Reference scenario Constant CO2 tax of 10 US$2000 per tonne in Annex B  
(excluding the US) 
Alternative scenario I Global CO2 tax rising linearly from 26 US$2000 in 2013  
to 100 US$2000 in 2050 
Alternative scenario II Same CO2 tax as in Alternative scenario I, and  
75 per cent subsidy to investments in CCS technologies 
 
Both alternative scenarios assume a global effort to address the climate change problem after the 
Kyoto Protocol expires at the end of 2012. Alternative Scenario I departs from the Reference Scenario 
in that the afore-mentioned CO2 tax is replaced by a global tax in 2013. This new CO2 tax increases 
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linearly from 26 US$2000 per tonne of CO2 in 2013 to 100 US$2000 per tonne in 2050. Although other 
scenarios may be viewed as more realistic, the intention of Alternative Scenario I is to examine the 
impacts of increased CO2 tax, both in depth (in terms of the ascending values) and in scope (in terms 
of more regions conducting the tax), on the incentives to invest in power plants with CCS 
technologies, and the subsequent effects on energy prices. 
 
Alternative Scenario II is built on Alternative Scenario I. In addition to the CO2 tax imposed, 
substantial subsidies to investments in CCS technologies are introduced in the model from 2013. The 
subsidy rate is initially set to 75 per cent, but we also report the results of other subsidy levels. Note 
that investing in CCS technologies also involves other extra costs, such as reduced efficiency and 
higher operating costs. The purpose of this alternative scenario is to investigate the effects on energy 
prices and market shares in the power market of implementing such targeted subsidies, which may be 
introduced as supplements to a price on emissions in order to hasten the introduction of carbon 
capture. 
4.2 Reference Scenario 
We start by briefly presenting the Reference Scenario, as it develops from 2010 to 2050. Note that this 
is not a projection of the future, but a benchmark scenario for examining potential effects of different 
policies. Moreover, the further into the future we look, the more uncertainty there is about income 
growth, demand conditions and costs of different (especially emerging) technologies.  
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Figure 1.  Global power production (Mtoe) from different technologies and global CO2 
emissions (Gigatons) per year. Reference scenario 
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As shown in Figure 1, without any climate policy beyond current policies, worldwide coal power 
production increases considerably. Its market share grows from around 40 per cent in 2000 to around 
55 per cent in 2050. Due to high gas prices (see below), gas power production grows only slowly, 
whereas oil power production declines as existing capacity is phased out. By assumption, nuclear 
power production grows moderately. Obviously, there is no power production with CCS without new 
policies. Renewable power production grows by around 2 per cent per year despite any climate or 
renewable policies, with almost 10 per cent annual growth for the two endogenous technologies wind 
and bio power.12 
 
Global CO2 emissions almost triple from 2000 to 2050, showing the tremendous task of trying to 
reduce emissions from current levels. Global emissions from the power sector increase by 150 per cent 
in the same period, and constitute one third of total emissions in 2050. Total emissions in OECD 
double in these 50 years, and emissions in Former Soviet Union almost double. Total emissions in the 
rest of the world increase by more than a factor of 4.13 
                                                     
12 Note that this development in the power sector is only based on profitability considerations for the endogenous 
technologies, assuming equal costs of the same technology around the world. Any barriers to e.g. wind power investments in 
developing countries or coal power production in developed countries are ignored. For the exogenous renewable 
technologies, some growth in power production is assumed towards 2050. 
13 The growth in CO2 emissions in our baseline scenario lies in the upper-end of other long-term scenarios, especially for 
OECD (IPCC, 2007; EIA, 2008). This is due to the low extraction costs and large reserves of coal, which makes coal very 
competitive compared to other energy sources in the long run (see also the preceding footnote). The A1F scenario outlined by 
the IPCC, with large and cheap access to fossil fuels, has even higher CO2 emissions than our baseline scenario in 2050. 
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Figure 2. Global mean energy prices. Reference scenario. US$2000 per toe 
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The initial price of steam coal is substantially below the price of natural gas (see Figure 2), which 
explains the strong growth for coal power and slow growth for gas power seen in Figure 1. However, 
the large increase in coal demand pushes coal prices upwards and reduces the price differential 
between gas and coal until 2030. The rising price trend for natural gas after 2030 is due to the fact that 
depletion of the least expensive gas fields makes remaining gas resources more costly to develop. 
Notice that the prices of gas (and electricity) have a tendency to over and under shoot, which is due to 
the assumption of adaptive price expectations. 
 
Interestingly, the price of electricity does not rise notably over this time horizon, despite increased 
prices of coal and natural gas. There are two reasons for that: First, coal power production is still 
profitable at higher coal prices and unchanged electricity prices in 2050, which is partly due to 
increased average efficiency in coal power plants. Initially, investment growth is dampened because 
marginal investment costs increase if the capacity growth is too rapid. Second, wind and bio power 
expand considerably, and obtain significant market shares in the last couple of decades. The gradual 
production growth is again due to the fact that rapid expansion (relative to existing capacities) is 
costly, but also partly due to cost reductions following learning by doing effects. 
4.3 Alternative scenarios 
Next, we consider the two policy scenarios, i.e., Alternative Scenarios I-II. We are particularly 
interested in what effects the policies have on the expansion of CCS technologies, and how energy 
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prices and market shares are affected. Note that, unless otherwise specified, when we refer to coal or 
gas power production, we mean production from both conventional plants and plants with CCS 
installed. 
 
Consider first Alternative Scenario I, which is a quite ambitious climate policy scenario with a global 
price on CO2 from 2013. We see from Figure 3 that the effects on global power prices are significant: 
In the period 2020-2040, producer prices are 35-65 per cent higher than in the Reference Scenario.14 
At the end of our time horizon, the price increase is less pronounced as more renewable power 
production is phased in (see below).  
 
A price on CO2 reduces the demand of coal, the most carbon-intensive fossil fuel. Consequently, the 
global mean price of coal falls considerably compared to the Reference Scenario, cf. Figure 4. Natural 
gas is the least carbon intensive fossil fuel, and the effects on gas prices are initially mixed (see Figure 
5). In the long term, gas prices seem to increase as gas power is stimulated by the climate policy (see 
below). Consumption of gas in other sectors, on the other hand, is reduced as substitution possibilities 
towards gas from other fossil fuels are fewer than in the power sector. 
 
Figure 3. Global mean electricity prices. Percentage change from Reference scenario 
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14 Note that all figures show effects on producer prices (i.e., the prices power producers get), not end-user prices. Percentage 
effects on end-user prices will in general be lower, as they typically also include distribution costs and taxes. 
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Figure 4. Global mean steam coal prices. Percentage change from Reference scenario 
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Figure 5. Global mean natural gas prices. Percentage change from Reference scenario 
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The climate policy imposed in Alternative Scenario I has substantial effects on the market shares in 
the power market. In particular, investments are shifted towards less carbon-intensive energy inputs. 
Previously installed capacity, however, is still profitable to run in most cases, and so market shares 
shift only gradually. 
 
As seen in Figure 6, coal power production grows very little after 2013, compared to a hefty growth in 
the Reference Scenario. New investments in coal power are substantially reduced. Conventional coal 
power production (without CCS) peaks just before 2030, and is reduced by 75 per cent in 2050 as a 
major share of coal power plants is equipped with carbon capture.  
 
Figure 6. Global production of coal power (including plants with CCS). Mtoe per year 
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Figure 7. Global production of gas power (including plants with CCS). Mtoe per year 
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Figure 8. Global production of renewable power. Mtoe per year  
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Coal power is partly substituted by gas power – global gas power production increases as a 
consequence of the price on CO2, cf. Figure 7. However, less than 10 per cent of the reduction in coal 
power supply caused by the climate policy is replaced by gas power. After 2040, a substantial increase 
in renewable power supply dampens the increase in electricity prices, and investments in new gas 
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power plants are depressed. This illustrates how climate policy is a double-edged sword for gas power 
plants: Moderate or short-lived climate policies will most likely benefit natural gas as its main 
competitor is coal, whereas strong and long-lived climate policies may have opposite effects as CO2-
free alternatives become more competitive. Conventional gas power production peaks around 2030, 
and drops by around two thirds towards 2050. 
 
Figure 8 shows how renewable power production eventually escalates when a global price on CO2 is 
introduced. Between 2020 and 2050, when power prices have increased and investments have started 
to kick-off, production of wind and bio power grows by 10-11 per cent per year on average. In 2050, 
renewable power has a market share of almost 50 per cent, compared to around 15 per cent in 2013. 
 
The CO2 price gradually makes carbon capture profitable, even without any subsidies (see “0% 
(Alt.Scen.I)” in Figure 9). After 2030, when the CO2 price has reached 60 US$2000 per ton, CCS 
equipment is installed on a large number of existing coal and gas power plants. In addition, a small 
amount of new gas and coal power plants with carbon capture is built. By 2040, 15 per cent of all 
power production comes from CCS plants, and by 2050 the share has doubled. A large majority of 
coal and gas power plants are then CCS plants. Carbon capture is mostly installed in coal power 
plants, especially when the growth accelerates after 2035. Towards the end of our time horizon, 
however, the share of gas power plants that are retrofitted with CCS increases as the number of 
conventional coal power plants is significantly reduced.  
 
Figure 9. Global power production with CCS. Mtoe per year 
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Figure 10 shows that global emissions of CO2 are significantly reduced in Alternative Scenario I 
compared to the Reference Scenario, especially after 2030 when CCS is phased in and renewable 
power production captures significant market shares. Still, emissions continue to rise somewhat, which 
indicates that even stronger climate policies are needed in order to curb global emissions of CO2. 
Emissions in the power sector are considerably reduced after 2030, but emissions in other sectors, 
where substitution possibilities are less, still increase to a large extent due to economic growth.15 
 
Figure 10. Global emissions of CO2  
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Next, we are interested in how subsidies to CCS investments may affect the power sector (Alternative 
Scenario II). First, let us look at how it influences the deployment of CCS. This is shown in Figure 9, 
which also shows the results of alternative subsidy rates. We see that subsidising CCS investment 
costs by 75 per cent accelerates the use of CCS substantially. Furthermore, the figure indicates that 
going from no subsidy to 50 per cent subsidy has less of an impact than increasing the subsidy from 50 
to 75 (or 100) per cent (remember that CCS plants also have higher operating costs and lower 
efficiency). A 50 per cent subsidy advances the expansion of CCS by merely 3-4 years, whereas a 75 
per cent subsidy advances it by at least ten years. 
 
Intuitively, it is tempting to assume that CCS subsidies should increase total production of coal and 
gas power, reduce electricity prices and increase coal and gas prices. However, as shown in Section 2, 
                                                     
15 This conclusion should be cautioned as the model does not take into account alternatives to fossil fuels and electricity 
except in the power sector (for instance a shift to electric or hydrogen driven cars in the transportation sector). 
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effects on energy prices and market shares are in general ambiguous. This is also confirmed by the 
numerical simulations, as the results vary over time. In Figure 3 we see that subsidising carbon capture 
have mixed impacts on electricity prices (compared to Alternative Scenario I). The same is true for gas 
prices (Figure 5), whereas coal prices are consistently increased by the subsidy (Figure 4). 
The effects on power production are in line with the price effects: Total supply of coal power increases 
as a consequence of the CCS subsidy, but only moderately (Figure 6). The effect on total gas power 
production is mixed (Figure 7), and the same applies to total power production. The explanation is the 
following:  
 
When carbon capture is subsidised, a large amount of existing coal and gas power plants are equipped 
with CCS technology. In comparison, very few new plants with CCS are built. Thus, instead of 
stimulating gas and coal power investments (with CCS), the subsidy mainly changes the emission 
intensity and efficiency of the existing plants. This has two opposing effects: On the one hand, reduced 
emissions make the plant more profitable, and hence increases the lifetime of the plant. This is 
especially relevant for coal power plants, as coal has higher emission factor than gas. On the other 
hand, reduced efficiency means that more fuel is required to produce the same amount of electricity. 
Thus, the demand for coal and gas from the power sector increases even if coal and gas power 
production is unchanged. This leads to higher prices of gas and coal, making existing plants less 
profitable and depressing investments in new capacity. In addition, substantial investments in CCS 
increase the costs of conventional coal and gas power investment somewhat (a slight crowding out 
effect)  
 
The small impacts on electricity prices imply that renewable production is only slightly affected by the 
CCS subsidy, at least until the last decade (Figure 8). Its market share in 2040 (2050) is reduced from 
36 (48) to 35 (45) per cent because of the subsidy. When at the same time the market share of CCS 
increases from 14 (28) to 38 (38) per cent (Figure 9), it is fair to conclude that supporting CCS is not a 
threat to the growth in renewable power production. 
 
Subsidising CCS has significant effects on global CO2 emissions, at least temporarily (Figure 10). In 
2030-35 global emissions are 10-12 per cent lower than in Alternative Scenario I. However, in 2050 
emissions are only three per cent lower, as CCS is being installed in large amount even without the 
subsidy (see above). 
4.4 Sensitivity analyses 
The results in Alternative Scenario II may seem somewhat surprising, and thus call for extensive 
sensitivity analyses. In this subsection we therefore present the results of making significant changes 
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in some crucial assumptions related to CCS. The results of the different sensitivity analyses are 
summarised in Table 4, where we report percentage changes in prices and production over the period 
2020-2050, compared to Alternative Scenario I.16 Figure 11 shows how CCS utilisation develops in 
the different sensitivity analyses under Alternative Scenario II. 
 
Table 4. Results from sensitivity analyses. Percentage changes from Alternative Scenario I* 
Sensitivity  
analysis 
Time 
period 
Coal 
power 
Gas 
power 
Renew. 
power 
Coal 
price 
Gas  
price 
Electr. 
price 
Main scenarios  
(Alt. Scen. II) 2020-2050 3.0% 1.3% -3.3% 4.1% -1.5% -1.5% 
S1. Higher efficiency 
of CCS plants 2020-2050 3.0% -0.8% -1.3% 3.5% 2.1% -1.7% 
S2. Higher initial costs 
of CCS 2020-2050 3.9% 0.3% -2.5% 5.1% 8.3% -2.4% 
S3. Higher learning 
rates of CCS 2020-2050 2.4% -0.6% 0.3% 3.6% 8.2% -0.3% 
S4. Higher costs of 
retrofitting CCS 2020-2050 3.5% -0.7% -1.7% 5.0% 7.8% -2.1% 
S5. CCS subsidy only 
in OECD 2020-2050 2.2% 2.2% -2.2% 3.7% -1.9% -1.3% 
* In scenario S1 the efficiency losses compared to plants without CCS are reduced by 50%. In scenarios S2 and 
S4 the initial costs of respectively CCS and retrofitting CCS are increased by 50%. In scenario S3 the learning 
rates for CCS are increased by 50%. 
 
The sensitivity analyses seem to confirm that total coal power supply and coal prices increase as a 
result of subsidizing CCS. The results for gas power production and natural gas prices are mixed, as 
we also noticed in Figures 5 and 7. Gas prices do however increase quite much in some scenarios. In 
these scenarios the increased demand for gas from gas power plants (retrofitted) with CCS really 
drives up the natural gas price, even though total gas power supply is almost unchanged. 
 
The average electricity price is decreased by the CCS subsidy in all sensitivity analyses, but the price 
reduction is generally small. Total power production in 2020-2050 increases by 0.3-0.9 per cent in the 
six scenarios. Supply of renewable power is also affected only slightly. Thus, we may conclude that 
subsidising CCS will have modest effects on market shares and total power production in the power 
market, even though it brings about a substantial acceleration of CCS deployment. 
 
                                                     
16 Obviously, Alternative Scenario I also changes when we change parameter values. Thus, the table displays changes 
between the new Alternative Scenarios I and II. 
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Figure 11.  Global power production with CCS in Alternative Scenario II under different 
sensitivity analyses. Mtoe per year 
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5. Conclusions 
Major policy initiatives are required in order to reduce the growth and eventually the level of global 
CO2 emissions. Both prices on CO2 and subsidies to low-carbon energy or technologies such as CCS 
will probably be important elements of future climate policies around the world. This paper has 
examined the effects of such policies on international energy markets, with emphasis on the power 
market and prices of different energy goods. A detailed numerical model of international energy 
markets have been used to analyse these effects. 
 
Our first conclusion is not very surprising: An ambitious climate policy will have substantial effects in 
the power market. Renewable power production will grow much faster over the next decades, and 
carbon capture will eventually become profitable. Conventional coal power production will be 
significantly reduced, whereas gas power will benefit. Prices of electricity will rise, coal prices will 
fall, whereas the effects on gas prices are mixed. 
 
Our next conclusion is less obvious: Subsidising carbon capture on top of the climate policy will not 
impede the development of renewable power, even if CCS utilisation is substantially accelerated. We 
find that subsidising CCS will only slightly increase the total production of coal and gas power (with 
or without CCS), as emphasis is put on installing CCS equipment on the existing stock of coal and gas 
power plants. On the one hand, this increases the lifetime of especially coal power plants. On the other 
25 
hand, as plants with carbon capture require more fuel input than conventional plants for the same 
amount of electricity produced, prices of coal and gas are driven upward, reducing the profitability of 
coal and gas power. Thus, electricity prices are only slightly reduced, and the effects on renewable 
power production are therefore small. Our sensitivity analyses confirm these overall findings. 
 
Finally, the analysis suggests that both climate policy scenarios will eventually drastically reduce CO2 
emissions from the power sector – subsidising carbon capture will accomplish this much sooner. 
However, unless alternative energy sources or technologies are introduced in the other sectors of the 
economy, global emissions of CO2 will continue to rise despite the ambitious climate policy examined 
in this analysis. 
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